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PROBLEMS

OF

PARAPHRASE: B OTTOM ’S D REAM

ABSTRACT: Philosophers and critics alike often contend that
metaphors cannot or should not be paraphrased, ever. Yet a simple and decisive empirical argument — The Horse’s Mouth Argument — suffices to show that many metaphors can be paraphrased
without violating the spirit in which they were put forward in the
first place. This argument leaves us with urgent unanswered questions about the role of paraphrase in a more inclusive division of
exegetical labor, about the tension between its notorious openendedness and its claim to restate something already stated, and
about the relation between the content of a paraphrase and the
content (or contents) of the metaphor the paraphrase purports to
explain. But it leaves us in a position to state such questions more
clearly and hopefully than we could before.
To Stanley Cavell
PARAPHRASE AND METAPHOR’S BOTTOMLESSNESS

God’s my life! Stolen hence, and left me asleep? I have
had a most rare vision. I have had a dream, past the wit of
man to say what dream it was. Man is but an ass if he go
about to expound this dream. Methought I was — there is
no man can tell what. Methought I was — and methought
I had — but man is but a patched fool if he will offer to

say what methought I had. The eye of man hath not heard,
the ear of man hath not seen, man’s hand is not able to
taste, his tongue to conceive, nor his heart to report, what
my dream was. I will get Peter Quince to write a ballad of
this dream: it shall be called “Bottom’s Dream,” because it
hath no bottom. . . . — A Midsummer Night’s Dream, IV, i,
204-215.
And we speake wysdome among them that are perfecte: not
the wysdome of this world, neither of the chiefest of this
world which come to nought. But we speake of the wysdome of God, which is hid, in a mysterie, to wit, that secret
wisdome, which God ordeyned before the world, vnto our
glorie. Which wysdome none of the heads of this world
knewe; for had they knowen it, they wolde not have crucified the Lord of glorie. But we preache as it is written,
Things which eye hath not sene, and eare hath not heard, neither haue entred into mans mynde, which things God hath
prepared for them that loue hym. But God hath opened them
unto us by his Sprite, for the Spirite searcheth all things, yea,
the bottom of Goddes secretes. For what man knoweth the
things of a man: saue the sprite of a man which is with him?
euen so the things of God knoeth no man but the Spirite of
God. — I Corinthians 2, as rendered in the Geneva New
Testament of 15571
1.

In A Midsummer Night’s Dream, a weaver named Nick Bottom takes
to the woods with several of his fellow craftsmen to rehearse the fractured version of Pyramis and Thisbe they hope to perform at the wedding of Theseus, Duke of Athens, to the conquered Amazon Queen Hippolyta. While awaiting his cue, Bottom is transformed, translated as
Peter Quince rather nicely puts it, turned into an ass from the neck
up, by the intervention of Robin Goodfellow, a.k.a. Puck, servant to
Oberon, king of the fairies. Oberon has been feuding with his queen
Titania, and at his command Puck squeezes into her eyes as she sleeps
a juice with the power to make her fall desperately in love with the
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first living creature she sees when she awakens. As things fall out, this
creature proves to be the translated Bottom. So Bottom was in fact
wide awake throughout his so-called dream, wherein he proves more
convincing in his involuntary role of ass than he will ever be in his voluntary role of Pyramus. What I’ve quoted are words Bottom speaks to
himself when he awakens from a subsequent dreamless sleep with his
old head restored to him, full of confused and fragmentary memories
of what befell him in the woods the previous night.
Bottom quickly concludes that this dream of his won’t admit of explanation or exposition — “Man is but an ass if he go about to expound
this dream” — but that it needs and deserves a ballad instead, a ballad
he proposes to commission from his friend Peter Quince, as if such a
marvelous work of unconscious art deserved a more consciously composed companion work to preserve, extend, and celebrate its wonders.
He associates these conclusions of his about the proper response to his
vision with its bottomlessness, a feature we might try to understand in
two very different ways.
(a) First Possibility: A bottom is the wooden core to the skein of
wool that Nick Bottom would routinely employ in his day job as
weaver. If this is the sort of bottom that Bottom’s dream lacks, the
sensible-sounding effort to reach a simple solid core at the center of his vision by patiently unwinding the twisted and colorful
spectacle at its manifest surface would leave one with nothing but
a tangle of discarded yarn. In this specific sense, Bottom’s vision
would be baseless, empty, vain — however precious we may find
it if we don’t ask it to mean anything.
(b) Second Possibility: A vision we can get to the bottom of (with
God’s help) is the divine mystery or secret of human salvation declared by St. Paul in the well-known passage from 1 Corinthians
that Nick Bottom echoes (and mangles) in his speech. God opens
this secret to us by his spirit in a manner that bypasses messy appeals to human eyes or ears or reasonings or imaginings. Deep as
it is, we may plumb this secret to its very bottom once and for all
by merely opening our hearts to it — or so Paul assures us. Now
however wonderful Bottom’s vision may be, it is utterly unlike
the divine vision of which Paul speaks. For one thing, its content
is vividly and memorably profane. For another, it depends richly
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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but strangely on the standard human cognitive faculties Paul professes to do without. Richly, since Bottom’s vision is an affair of
the eyes and ears and hands and tongue, not or not merely an
affair of the heart. Strangely, since Bottom’s vision confounds
the standard roles of standard cognitive faculties to puzzling and
striking effect; it is a vision wherein we must do our best to hear
with our eyes, see with our ears, taste with our hands, conceive
with our tongues, and report with our hearts. (Poems require just
these stunts of us on a regular basis.) If we wish to see further
into such a vision — it isn’t the sort of thing we ever could see all
the way into — we must conjure it back and contrive to re-enter
it. Attempting to pack its gist into inevitably inadequate expository language won’t really help. To understand it is to reinhabit
it.
Take your pick: “no bottom because no foundation, [or] no bottom
because unfathomably profound,” as Harold F. Brooks puts it in the introduction to his edition of the play.2
The manifest content of Bottom’s “dream,” approximately and in
part, is that Bottom is (or recently was) an ass. So issues about the
proper treatment of Bottom’s waking vision inevitably call to mind the
corresponding issues about the proper treatment of the verbally managed waking visions known as metaphors: should we expound them,
or should we conjure them back by writing ballads in their honor? Can
we expound Bottom’s dream (by expounding its manifest content) or
its companion metaphor “Bottom is an ass” (by expounding its literal
meaning so as to disclose some metaphorical content or truth condition) without making asses of ourselves in the process? Or does the inherent bottomlessness of dream and metaphor alike preclude anything
of the sort?
At the beginning of one of the finest philosophical essays on metaphor,
Davidson says:
Metaphor is the dreamwork of language, and like all dreamwork, its interpretation reflects as much on the interpreter
as on the originator. The interpretation of dreams requires
collaboration between a dreamer and a waker, even if they
be the same person; and the act of interpretation is itself a
work of the imagination. So too understanding a metaphor
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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is as much a creative endeavor as making a metaphor, and
as little guided by rules.3
I agree a metaphor is like a dream, in that its interpretation is a creative enterprise and a collaborative one. I even agree with Davidson’s
companion contention that a metaphor is like a joke, in that we must
relish it and appreciate it in order to understand it. Yet I take the interpretation of metaphors to be guided by rules, albeit rules of a special
and difficult-to-elicit kind, offering a special and difficult-to-elicit kind
of guidance. This is linked with my sense that despite everything Davidson says to the contrary, a proper interpretation of a metaphor can take
the form of an exposition or paraphrase — needn’t take the form of anything remotely like a ballad. As for bottomlessness, I’ll have more to say
about that shortly.
2.

One thing we sometimes do in order to demonstrate that we understand
a particular metaphor or to indicate how we understand it is paraphrase
the metaphor in question. In a famous passage from his extraordinary
early essay “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,”4 Stanley Cavell
writes:
Now suppose I am asked what someone means who says,
“Juliet is the sun.” . . . I may say something like: Romeo
means that Juliet is the warmth of his world; that his day
begins with her; that only in her nourishment can he grow.
And his declaration suggests that the moon, which other
lovers use as an emblem of their love, is merely her reflected
light, and dead in comparison; and so on. In a word, I
paraphrase it.
Asked in the same spirit what someone means who says a work is the
death mask of its conception,5 I may say something like:
Benjamin means that a work (of prose) is the enduring yet
lifeless trace of the idea that produced it; a permanent reminder, in fact a souvenir, of that idea; and so on.
Cavell continues:
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Moreover, if I could not provide an explanation of this form,
that is a very good reason, a perfect reason, for supposing
that I do not know what it means. Metaphors are paraphrasable.
He takes paraphrasability to differentiate metaphors from stretches of
fully literal prose (on the one hand) and uses of language possessing
various other kinds of poetic ambition and interest (on the other). A
footnote Cavell added when he reprinted the piece clarifies this claim
somewhat:
I should have made it more explicit that throughout this
essay I am using “paraphrase” to name solely that specific
form of account which suits metaphors (marked, for example, by its concluding sense of “and so on.”) So when I
say that stretches of literal prose “cannot be paraphrased,”
I mean to imply the specification “. . . in that way.”
Cavell goes on:
Two points now emerge: (1) The “and so on” which ends
my example of paraphrase is significant. It registers what
William Empson called the “pregnancy” of metaphors, the
burgeoning of meaning in them. [This helps to differentiate metaphors from the corresponding similes.] If you say
“Juliet is like the sun,” . . . the drive of it leads me to expect
you to continue by saying in what definite respects they are
like (similes are just a little bit pregnant); and, in complement I wait for you to tell me what you mean, to deliver
your meaning, so to speak. It is not up to me to find as much
as I can in your words. The over-reading of metaphors so
often complained of, no doubt justly, is a hazard they must
run for their high interest. (2) To give the paraphrase, to
understand the metaphor, I must understand the ordinary
or dictionary meanings of the words it contains, and understand that they are not there being used in their ordinary
way, that the meanings they invite are not to be found opposite them in a dictionary. In this respect the words in
metaphors function as they do in idioms [fall flat on one’s
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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face, a thorn in one’s side, a bee in one’s bonnet, a fly in one’s
ointment, etc.].
But while how one is to understand a particular idiom is something that
can be given once and for all, how one is to understand a particular
metaphor is something subject to open-ended exploration. And while
a language’s stock of available idioms is finite and can be mastered,
perhaps must be mastered, one idiom at a time, its stock of available
metaphors is infinite and can be mastered only on terms that prepare
us in advance to cope with novel and unprecedented instances. (It follows that although our understanding of an idiom like “bite the bullet”
is in no way diminished by ignorance of its origins in the grim realities
of battlefield surgery in days before anesthesia, our understanding of
a metaphor like “The cowslips tall her pensioners be” is diminished at
least somewhat by any shakiness in our sense of what it took in Elizabethan days to be a pensioner, literally speaking.)
Both these differences between idioms and metaphors contribute to
a sense that while we can confer or display mastery of an idiom by
telling how it is to be understood — offering a non-idiomatic word or
expression we take to be synonymous with the idiom, taken idiomatically — we can confer or display mastery of a metaphor only by explaining how it is to be understood, implicitly relating what we propose to
make of it to the standing pre-metaphorical powers of the words and
constructions from which it is composed. Apparently Cavell takes paraphrases to be in the business of explaining to us, not merely telling us,
how metaphors are to be understood.6
There are two apparent obstacles to accepting this suggestion as it
stands.
First, it’s often claimed that metaphors are intrinsically unparaphrasable — that efforts to reformulate metaphors in more nearly literal
language are (a) bound to fail or at least (b) bound to violate the real
spirit and interest of the language they purport to explain. On (a), paraphrasing a metaphor is something that simply can’t be done. On (b),
perhaps you can do it, at least sometimes, but doing it would always be
a bad idea. Even attempting to paraphrase a metaphor betrays either
(a) a misunderstanding or (b) a lack of appreciation of the very language you’re presumably out to understand and out to appreciate. It’s
often hinted that the unparaphrasability of metaphors follows from the
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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fact that metaphor is a poetic use of language.
Second, even if paraphrase is both possible and appropriate where
metaphor is concerned, in what way does paraphrase take on the job of
explaining to us, rather than merely telling us, how a given metaphor
is to be understood? Cavell’s ambitions for the notion as they come out
in his contrast between metaphor and idiom appear to require that a
paraphrase do more than provide a synonymous form of words, yet it
can actually appear to do somewhat less, since it looks for all the world
like a partial restatement of what the metaphor itself already stated.
The words “and so on” suggest as much.
To make headway on these difficult issues, we need to consider how
Cavell came to insist on the essential paraphrasability of metaphors in
the first place.
3.

Paraphrase and its Latin ancestor paraphrasis are terms that have long
been employed for a wide range of modes of elaborative restatement in
a wide variety of media. What gets counted as restatement varies as a
function of what gets counted as statement in the first place.
Some forms of paraphrase aim to re-express the plain sense or main
gist of an original that is difficult to take in as it stands for one reason or another: think of a lawyer’s paraphrase of an obscure statute, a
preacher’s paraphrase of a cryptic Scriptural passage, or the paraphrase
of the naked female form (simplifying the original in some respects,
complicating it in others) afforded by a Cranach nude.7 Others aim to
adapt a readily comprehended original to a medium that by its nature
forbids kinds of terseness the original exhibits or invites kinds of complication the original lacks: think of a polyphonic paraphrase by Palestrina
of a bit of late medieval plainsong or an orchestral paraphrase by Liszt
of a Verdi aria.
4.

An especially important form of elaborative restatement occurs from
time to time as a literary text is translated from one natural language
into another. In the theory and practice of translation, paraphrase is ofVol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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ten contrasted with word-by-word or literal rendering on the one hand
and independent creation masquerading as translation on the other.
In regard to translation [Dryden] sought to trace a via
media between the word-for-word approach demanded by
purists among divines and grammarians, and the wild idiosyncrasies displayed in Cowley’s Pindarique Odes of 1656.
Dryden’s sensibility, both as theoretician and translator, was
persuaded that neither could lead to the right solution. No
less than the classic poet, the modern translator must stand
at the clear, urbane center.
He defined as metaphrase the process of converting an
author word for word, line by line, from one tongue to
another. The adverse example was Ben Jonson’s translation of Horace’s Art of Poetry published in 1640. Both Jonson’s results and common sense demonstrated that literalism was self-defeating. No one can translate both verbally
[i.e., word by word, word for word] and well. Dryden’s
simile retains its charm: “ ’Tis much like dancing on ropes
with fettered legs: a man may shun to fall by using caution;
but gracefulness of motion is not to be expected: and when
we have said the best of it, ’tis but a foolish task; for no
sober man would put himself into danger for the applause
of escaping without breaking his neck.”
At the opposite extreme we find imitation “where the
translator (if now he has not lost that name) assumes the
liberty not only to vary from the words and sense, but to forsake them both as he sees occasion.” Here the cautionary
example is Cowley’s extravagant transformation of Pindar
and Horace. . . Dryden will have none of it. The imitator
is no better, and often worse, than the composer who appropriates his theme from another and produces his own
variations. This may well turn up scintillating stuff and it
will show the translator to virtuoso advantage, but it is “the
greatest wrong which can be done to the memory and reputation of the dead.”8
By the way it mingles the characteristic look of its subject with the
characteristic look of charcoal on paper, a life drawing makes its status
www.thebalticyearbook.org

10

Problems of Paraphrase: Bottom’s Dream

as a rendering of an absent original immediately evident to the onlooker; only by doing so can the drawing bear honest witness to the
subject and the subject’s own looks in what is after all an alien medium.
By the way it mingles the characteristic sound of an original poet’s creative speech with the characteristic sound of expository commentary, a
paraphrastic translation makes its status as a rendering in English of
a Latin original immediately evident to the reader; only by doing so
can it bear honest witness to the nature of that original in what is after all a foreign tongue. In either case, accurate rendering may call
for an accumulation of partial equivalents, each with its characteristic
strengths and weaknesses. Sometimes the best way to depict a single
contour is by superimposing several distinct and individually unsatisfactory stabs at depicting it, several distinct and individually unsatisfactory
lines, with the result that what we see on the page may be more tangled
than the scene it depicts. Sometimes the best way to translate a compact Latin phrase is by juxtaposing several different and individually
unsatisfactory stabs at translating it, several distinct and individually
unsatisfactory English phrases, with the result that what we read on the
page may be looser and more longwinded than the Latin it renders.
Because it exploits the distinctive resources of a particular natural
language in especially strenuous ways, figuration is especially resistant to word-by-word rendering in a second language, hence especially
likely to undergo explanatory elaboration at the hands of a conscientious translator. Here is Dryden again:
I thought . . . to keep as near my author as I could, without losing all his graces, the most eminent of which are in
the beauty of his words; and those words [i.e., the words
that can be numbered among a particular writer’s distinctive
graces] are always figurative. Such of these as would retain
their elegance in our tongue, I have endeavoured to graff
on it; but most of them are of necessity to be lost, because
they will not shine in any but their own.9
5.

But suppose you believe — falsely, in my opinion10 — that a fully successful work of art needs to make optimal use of the materials available
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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to it, with the result that any change whatsoever in the finished work
would detract from its power or significance in some way or other. Suppose you also believe — again in my opinion falsely — that paraphrases,
translations, and rewordings more generally put themselves forward as
potential surrogates or substitutes for the language they propose to explain. Then you’ll be ready to contend with Robert Frost that “poetry
is what is lost in translation,”11 or as Coleridge famously put it back in
1817:
In poetry, in which every line, every phrase, may pass the
ordeal of deliberation and deliberate choice, it is possible,
and barely possible, to attain the ultimatum which I have
ventured to propose as the infallible test of a blameless
style, namely its untranslateableness in words of the same
language without injury to the meaning. Be it observed,
however, that I include in the meaning of a word not only
its correspondent object, but likewise all the associations
which it recalls. For language is framed to convey not the
object alone, but likewise the character, mood and intentions of the person who is representing it.12
The form of translation Coleridge’s argument most immediately targets
is translation from English back into English, translation of allegedly
fancy English into allegedly plain English, translation from metaphorese
into literalese being a special case of this.
Coleridge pursues his argument one step further, in a manner characteristic of Romanticism and of later thought heavily indebted to Romanticism. If meaning is whatever translation preserves insofar as
translation is successful, and if poetry is a use of language that attains
“untranslatableness in words of the same language” insofar as it is successful, then the more successful a poem becomes, the more relevant
every detail of its wording becomes to what we properly include in its
meaning, hence the more that meaning outruns any routine descriptive
truth-condition settled in a recursive rule-governed fashion by the syntax and semantics of the words and constructions from which the poem
is composed.
At this point, two further inferences become tempting.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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6.

On the one hand, if you are sufficiently impressed by the fact that ancient rhetoric and modern criticism alike define metaphor as a special
and specially indirect way of putting something, an indirect way of expressing a meaning that could be expressed in a more direct and literal
way instead, you’ll be inclined to conclude that there can’t really be any
metaphors in the first place — or that if some metaphors do exist, they
aren’t to be found where one might most expect to find them, in successful poetry. Such was the conclusion Croce was prepared to draw in
his 1901 Estetica:
To take a simple example [of the “emptiness” of traditional
rhetorical notions], there is the commonest definition of
metaphor as a word used in place of the literally correct
one. And why give oneself the trouble of substituting a
different word in place of the literally correct one and taking the longer and worse way when the shorter and better
is known to us? Perhaps because, as it is commonly said,
the literal word, in certain cases, is not as expressive as
the supposed nonliteral or metaphorical word? But if this
is the case, the metaphor just is in this event the “literal”
word; and which is usually called “literal,” if it were used
in this case, would be less expressive, and therefore wholly
improper.13
7.

On the other hand, if you consider it beyond dispute that metaphor is
one of the most basic forms poetry takes, one of the most basic units
poetry comes in, you’ll be inclined to think:
(a) That when ancient rhetoric and modern criticism define metaphor
as a specially indirect way of putting something, they must be
mischaracterizing what metaphor really is — mischaracterizing
what is really going on in their own examples of metaphor.
(b) That the more successful a poem is, the less possible it will be to
restate what it or its constituent metaphors manage to mean in
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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more literal terms.
(c) That efforts to paraphrase a poem or its constituent metaphors are
a distraction from our true task of grasping the poem’s meaning,
a task not clearly distinct from that of understanding the poem’s
total effect on us as we read it.
Such was the conclusion the New Critic Cleanth Brooks was prepared
to draw in the forties, in a chapter of The Well-Wrought Urn called “The
Heresy of Paraphrase.” Brooks speaks there of “the resistance which any
good poem puts up against all efforts to paraphrase it,” and continues:
We can very properly use paraphrases as pointers and as
shorthand references provided that we know what we are
doing. But it is highly important that we know what we are
doing and that we see plainly that the paraphrase is not the
real core of meaning which constitutes the essence of the
poem. . .
Let the reader try to formulate a proposition that will
say what the poem “says.” As his proposition approaches
adequacy, he will find, not only that it has increased greatly
in length, but that it has begun to fill itself up with reservations and qualifications — and most significant of all — the
formulator will find that he has himself begun to fall back
upon metaphors of his own in his attempt to indicate what
the poem “says.” In sum, his proposition, as it approaches
adequacy, ceases to be a proposition. . .
The truth is that all such formulations [of the “statement” made by a poem] lead away from the center of a
poem — not toward it; that the “prose sense” of the poem
is not a rack on which the stuff of the poem is hung; that it
does not represent the “inner” structure or “essential” structure or the “real” structure of the poem. . . We must not
mistake them for the internal and essential structure of the
building itself. . . 14
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where one wants to break in and insist on a few very familiar facts.
Whatever distinctive structures and distinctive designs on their readers
poems may possess, poems are still made out of language — a medium
designed for the formulation of determinate propositions and the presentation of determinate arguments. So whatever else the assessment
of poetry may ultimately involve, there must be some place in it for
judgments about the truth of particular determinate propositions and
the cogency of particular determinate arguments. And even if poetry
involves distinctively poetic way of embodying propositions and arguments in words, those ways will incorporate and build on the more
routine prosaic ways of accomplishing such tasks studied by various
branches of linguistics: syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and the rest.
One especially emphatic expression of this sort of impatience with
Coleridge’s children comes in the work of Brooks’s regular sparring partner, Yvor Winters.15 Winters takes susceptibility to paraphrase to be a
hallmark of something he calls reason in poetry. Good poems (and by
implication, good metaphors as well) always admit of paraphrase. And
the propositions a good paraphrase represents a poem as expressing are
always rationally respectable propositions — propositions worth pondering with care, no matter how patently false or patently incredible
they may be or may become, once we have pondered them. “The rational framework of a poem should bear inspection,” and paraphrase lays
bare this framework, opening it to rational inspection. If that framework proves to be “trivial and inconsecutive,” this betrays a hidden
triviality, a hidden inconsecutiveness, in a poem we might otherwise
be inclined to admire.16 The resistance to paraphrase we encounter in
various modes of modernist writing — imagism, symbolism, surrealism, and the rest — is real enough, but it involves an understandable
but regrettable flight from intelligibility, a surrender to unreason or irresponsibility, a misconceived attempt to express the modern world’s
looseness by writing loosely or to express its disintegration by allowing
one’s own writing to disintegrate.

9.
8.

One reaches a point in reviewing such Coleridge-inspired declarations
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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sophical dispute, and Cavell’s doctrine that metaphors are essentially
paraphrasable is an effort to condense this cloud of philosophy into a
drop of grammar.
Against Brooks, Cavell maintains that metaphors not only are but
must be paraphrasable. When I indulge in metaphor I always could
express what I want to say about my metaphor’s primary subject in some
other way instead, without even mentioning my metaphor’s secondary
subject. Indeed such re-expression of what I want to say is always a way,
perhaps sometimes the best way, of explaining the language I offered
the first time around. Paraphrase needn’t strike us as distracting us
from or violating the spirit of the language it purports to explain, once
we see that it isn’t competing with that language at that language’s own
game and doesn’t purport to be an effective general purpose surrogate
for that language, any more than a careful dictionary definition of the
word “cat” claims to be an effective general purpose surrogate for the
short, sweet, effectively irreplaceable word it expounds.
As for Winters, Cavell concedes that a considerable amount of modern poetry really does resist or even defy paraphrase in unprecedented
ways. He concludes from this that a considerable amount of modern
poetry consists of legitimate nonliteral uses of language that shouldn’t
be counted as metaphors. Modern poetry’s resistance to paraphrase
doesn’t represent a flight from intelligibility; it represents a flight from
old ways of making ourselves intelligible to new ways of doing so, ways
better adapted to the difficult times in which we live. The novel forms
of poetic language on offer in challenging modern poetry are “touchstones of intimacy” demanded by the unprecedented obstacles to intimate communication that poets confront in the modern world. (Cavell
cites Hart Crane and Wallace Stevens in this connection; early Auden
would do just as well.) Putting what such an intimacy-demanding,
intimacy-testing, intimacy-developing deployment of language says in
some other way is out of the question, since it isn’t straightforwardly
in the business of saying anything in the first place. Such deployments
of language have their own ways of being intelligible, and there will
be modes of explanation appropriate to displaying their intelligibility,
modes of explanation very different from paraphrase.
An example of such a touchstone of intimacy from outside poetry
proper may make all this a bit clearer. In an essay on Wittgenstein
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called “Secondary Sense,” Cora Diamond reports:
I once stood on a ledge behind a waterfall, where all I could
hear was water thundering down, all I could see in front of
me was thousands of gallons hurtling down. The experience
I had I could only describe by saying something like “Now I
know what ‘down’ means!”17
Of course her experience behind the waterfall didn’t literally teach Diamond the meaning of the word “down” — something she had obviously
mastered long before. Nor does Diamond’s remark metaphorically liken
her experience behind the waterfall to an earlier experience of learning
a word along lines we might explain by paraphrasing her remark the
way Cavell paraphrased Romeo’s. She isn’t so much describing her experience behind the waterfall as letting that experience express itself
in words it proves capable of eliciting from her. Arguably Diamond’s
remark is a mild philosopher’s joke, turning on a professional philosopher’s instinctive feel for bad old theories to the effect that word meanings are ideas, that ideas are faint copies of vivid impressions, etc. But
the best way of explaining Diamond’s remark to someone puzzled by it
won’t involve painstakingly anatomizing the logic of the mild little joke
at its heart. (Never explain a joke — at least, never admit that you’re
explaining it!) Instead it will consist in putting the reader in a position
to imagine wanting to utter Diamond’s own words from Diamond’s own
motives herself. That is what Diamond herself does or tries to do in the
passage I just quoted.
CAVEATS
10.

If one wants to side with Cavell on the essential paraphrasability of
metaphors, there are several hedges against misunderstanding one had
better issue right away.
First, to say that paraphrase is always possible isn’t to say it will
always be welcome or called for. In many contexts, paraphrasers are
party-poopers, spoiling the fun of others by explicitly spelling out what
can and should and often must go without saying. Here is Marianne
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Moore on the subject:
The following principles . . . are aids to composition by
which I try, myself, to be guided: if a long sentence with
dependent clauses seems obscure, one can break it into
shorter units by imagining what phrases it would fall into
as conversation; in the second place, expanded explanation
tends to spoil the lion’s leap — an awkwardness which is
surely brought home to one in conversation; and in the third
place, we must be as clear as our natural reticence allows us
to be.18
After all, metaphors themselves often function as touchstones of intimacy, and intimacy can tolerate only so much giving and taking of explanations.19 Here is Frost on the subject:
Revelation
We make ourselves a place apart
Behind light words that tease and flout,
But oh, the agitated heart
Till someone really find us out.
’Tis pity if the case require
(Or so we say) that in the end
We speak the literal to inspire
The understanding of a friend.
But so with all, from babes that play
At hide-and-seek to God afar,
So all who hide too well away
Must speak and tell us where they are.20
Second, Cavell may go too far when he contends that the ability
to paraphrase metaphors and related forms of literary language is a
criterion or perhaps the criterion of understanding such language, in
Wittgenstein’s proprietary sense of the term criterion. On the one hand,
a paraphrase might succeed as restatement while betraying in its wording a profound misunderstanding of the spirit of the language it purports to explain. Consider the strange plight of someone who with
straight face offers:
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Objective consideration of contemporary phenomena compels the conclusion that success or failure in competitive
activities exhibits no tendency to be commensurate with innate capacity, but that a considerable element of the unpredictable must inevitably be taken into account.
as a paraphrase of these familiar words from Ecclesiastes:
I returned and I saw under the sun, that the race is not to
the swift, not the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to
the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet
favor to men of skill; but time and chance happen to them
all.21
Such a listener has paraphrased (restated) correctly, at least up to a
point, yet he wouldn’t have paraphrased as he did if he had understood
the spirit of the language he was paraphrasing, and unless he understands that language’s spirit, he doesn’t understand it. On the other
hand, when Cavell says, “If I could not provide an explanation of this
form, that is a very good reason, a perfect reason, for supposing that I do
not know what it [Romeo’s metaphor] means [my emphasis],” he seems
not to allow for the fact that paraphrase is a sophisticated general pedagogical skill and some of us appear to get the hang of metaphor (and
of many particular metaphors) without ever getting the hang of it.
Third, although metaphors may be essentially paraphrasable, paraphrasable utterances needn’t be metaphorical. Many literal uses of
language invite the same sort of open-ended, approximative, reformulative explanation that metaphors do. In The Philadelphia Story,22 Tracy
Lord (Katherine Hepburn) has occasion to exclaim of a yacht called the
True Love, on which she spent her first honeymoon, “My she was yare!”
“Yare” is a technical term, a nautical term, a term of high praise. Tracy’s
new fiancé George Kittredge asks her what it means, and she says:
Tracy: [Under her breath and as if to herself:] What does
it mean? [Then out loud and as if to George:] Oh, easy to
handle, quick to the helm, fast, bright — everything a boat
should be — until she develops dry rot.
This last by way of rueful comment on Tracy’s first marriage, on Tracy
herself, or both. By then she is beginning to change the subject from
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sailboats to something else. Near the end of the film Tracy promises
to be yare herself. I take this promise to be an instance of metaphor:
there are metaphorical promises, metaphorical commands, metaphorical questions, etc., not just metaphorical statements. But Tracy’s original use of the term “yare” wasn’t metaphorical at all, and this is the use
she undertakes to explain to George and to us. One can almost hear
the understood and so on as Hepburn’s voice drops off in the patented
Hepburn manner after the word “bright.”
Fourth, Cavell’s quip about similes being only a little bit pregnant
should be taken with a grain of salt. One sees what he means: a great
many effective similes are pretty well exhausted by the compact explanation their author promptly and explicitly supplies. Bacon’s essays are
loaded with such stuff:
Virtue is like a rich stone, best plain set. — “Of Beauty”
Fame is like a river, that beareth up things light and swollen,
and drowns things weighty and solid. — “Of Praise”
Money is like muck, not good except it be spread.
— “Of Seditions and Troubles”
But similes can also be as designedly bottomless, as designedly resistant
to exhaustive explication, as their metaphorical counterparts:
One walking a fall meadow finds on all sides
The Queen-Anne’s lace lying like lilies on water.
— Richard Wilbur, “The Beautiful Changes”
Although affliction cometh not forth of the dust, neither
doth trouble spring out of the ground;
Yet man is born unto trouble, as the sparks fly upward.
— Job 5:6-7
They [The members of a crowd hopelessly waiting for an
endlessly delayed train] were like ruins in the wet, places
that is where life has been, palaces, abbeys, cathedrals,
throne rooms, pantries, cast aside and tumbled down with
no immediate life and with what used to be in them lost
rather than hidden now the roof has fallen in. — Henry
Green23
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Stupidity, delusion, selfishness and lust
Torment our bodies and possess our minds
And we sustain our affable remorse
The way a beggar nourishes his lice.
— Baudelaire, “Au Lecteur”24
Sometimes in the afternoon sky a white moon would creep
up like a little cloud, furtive, without display, suggesting an
actress who does not have to ‘come on’ for a while, and so
goes ‘in front’ in her ordinary clothes to watch the rest of
the company for a moment, but keeps in the background,
not wishing to attract attention to herself. — Proust25
Ideas in poetry should constitute a shifting, unutterable subtext to be glimpsed through spangles, like the houses of Parliament seen upside down in the Thames. — James Merrill26
Last and by no means least, we mustn’t fall into thinking of paraphrase as translation, even approximate and partial translation, into
literalese. As Brooks himself points out and as Cavell’s own paraphrase
of Romeo’s metaphor already illustrates, good paraphrases of interesting metaphors regularly resort to — Brooks would say “fall back on” —
additional metaphors of their own; their value as explanations would
be seriously diminished if we were to deprive them of this important
resource.
THE VINDICATION OF PARAPHRASE, OR THE HORSE’S MOUTH
11.

The frequently voiced conviction that paraphrase is always “heretical”
— always either (a) impossible or at least (b) a bad idea — is that rare
thing, a widely held philosophical thesis we can refute once and for all
on a straightforwardly empirical basis. For very often, and in the widest
possible variety of styles and periods, we find intelligent and rhetorically skillful speakers arranging to accompany their very own metaphors with their very own paraphrases. In the bulk of such cases the
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paraphrase follows or mostly follows the metaphor being paraphrased,
but occasionally it gets underway first.
Perhaps the single most familiar instance of this phenomenon — call
it authorized paraphrase — comes from Pascal’s Pensées:
Man is but a reed, the most feeble thing in nature; but he
is a thinking reed. The entire universe need not arm itself
to crush him. A vapor, a drop of water, suffices to kill him.
But if the universe were to crush him, man would still be
more noble than that which killed him, because he knows
that he dies and the advantage which the universe has over
him; the universe knows nothing of this.27
“Man is but a reed. . . but he is a thinking reed.” That much is metaphor.
The rest, I contend, is paraphrase — paraphrase from the horse’s mouth,
as it were — Pascal’s own paraphrase of Pascal’s own metaphorical utterance. (The paraphrase contains additional metaphor, of course, but
by now this should come as no surprise.)
Pascal is not alone; for some reason, thinking in summary terms
about humanity or human nature as such makes the impulse to paraphrase one’s own metaphors especially hard to resist:
Man is the most consummate of all mimics in the animal
world; none but himself can draw or model; none comes
near him in the scope, variety, and exactness of vocal imitation; none is such a master of gesture; while he seems to
be impelled thus to imitate for the sheer pleasure of it. And
there is no such another emotional chameleon. By a purely
reflex operation of the mind, we take the hue of passion of
those who are about us, or, it may be, the complementary
colour. . . — T.H. Huxley28
Man, at his best, remains a sort of one-lunged animal, never
completely rounded and perfect, as a cockroach, say, is perfect. If he shows one valuable quality, it is almost unheard
of for him to show any other. Give him a head, and he lacks
a heart. Give him a heart of a gallon capacity, and his head
holds scarcely a pint. — H.L. Mencken29
Difficult to realize that the past was once the present, and
that, transferred to it, one would be just the same little worm
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as to-day, unimportant, parasitic, nervous, occupied with
trifles, unable to go anywhere or alter anything, friendly
only with the obscure, and only at ease with the dead;
[while up on the heights the figures and forces who make
History would contend in their habitual fashion, with incomprehensible noises or in ominous quiet.] — E.M. Forster30
I’ve italicized the main metaphor in each passage; in each case the rest
of the passage (apart from the Forster material I’ve sequestered in brackets) is paraphrase, straight from the mouth of the relevant horse.
If authorized paraphrase is especially common in prose musings on
what it is to be human, it is common enough in other subject matters
and even in other genres. We find it in psychology:
Habit is thus the enormous flywheel of society, its most precious conservative agent. It alone is what keeps us all within
the bounds of ordinance, and saves the children of fortune
from the envious uprisings of the poor. It alone prevents
the hardest and most repulsive walks of life from being deserted by those brought up to tread therein. — William
James31
In economics:
Of all those expensive and uncertain projects, however, which
bring bankruptcy upon the greater part of the people who
engage in them, there is none perhaps more ruinous than
the search after new silver and gold mines. It is perhaps the
most disadvantageous lottery in the world, or the one in which
the gain of those who draw the prizes bears the least proportion to the loss of those who draw the blanks: for though the
prizes are few and the blanks many, the common price of a
ticket is the whole fortune of a very rich man. Projects of
mining, instead of replacing the capital employed in them,
together with the ordinary profits of stock, commonly absorb both capital and profit. They are the projects, therefore, to which of all others a prudent lawgiver, who desired
to increase the capital of his nation, would least choose to
give any extraordinary encouragement, or to turn towards
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them a greater share of that capital than that would go to
them of its own accord. . . —Adam Smith32
In metaphysics:
There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed internally by some other creature, since
one cannot transpose anything in it, nor can one conceive
of any internal motion that can be excited, directed, augmented, or diminished within it, as can be done in composites, where there can be change among the parts. The
monads have no windows through which something could enter or leave. Accidents cannot be detached, nor can they go
about outside of substances, as the sensible species of the
Scholastics once did. Thus, neither substance nor accident
can enter a monad from without. —Leibniz33
In the reflections of painters:
In the old days pictures went forward toward completion by stages. Every day brought something new. In my
case a picture is a sum of destructions. I do a picture — then
I destroy it. In the end, though, nothing is lost—the red I
took away from one place turns up somewhere else.
It would be interesting to preserve, photographically,
not the stages, but the metamorphoses of a picture. Possibly one might then discover the path followed by the brain
in materializing a dream. But there is one very odd thing
— to notice that basically a picture doesn’t change, that the
first “vision” remains almost intact, in spite of appearances.
I often ponder on a light and a dark when I have put them
into a picture; I try hard to break them up by interpolating a color that will produce a different effect. When the
work is photographed, I note that what I put in to correct
my first vision has disappeared, and that, after all, the photographic image corresponds with my first vision before the
transformation I insisted on. — Picasso34
In the last few examples authorized paraphrase eventually gives way
to other, more diffuse ways of explaining oneself and justifying one’s
assertions, but it’s hard to locate the transitions precisely.
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Lest one think that authorized paraphrase is inherently prosy or prosaic, it’s worth recalling that Grice’s main example of metaphor hailed
from a jaunty old pop standard that was fully prepared to paraphrase
itself:
You’re the cream in my coffee,
You’re the salt in my stew,
You will always be
My necessity,
I’d be lost without you. . . 35
In certain rare but memorable instances a metaphor comes at the end
of a passage, serving to sum up a stretch of text we understand in retrospect as paraphrasing its own conclusion. Here’s an especially studied
and spectacular instance:
Florizel: What you do
Still betters what is done. When you speak, sweet,
I’ld have you do it ever. When you sing,
I’ld have you buy and sell so, so give alms,
Pray so, and for the ord’ring of your affairs,
To sing them too. When you do dance, I wish you
A wave o’ the sea, that you might ever do
Nothing but that, move still, still so,
And own no other function. Each your doing,
So singular in each particular,
Crowns what you are doing in the present deeds,
That all your acts are queens. — The Winter’s Tale IV, iv, 135-45.
To charge that paraphrase is always either (a) impossible or (b) uncalled for is to accuse each and every one of these authors of either (a)
attempting the impossible or (b) responding in a manifestly inappropriate manner to his own words. When an accusation becomes this
sweeping, it discredits itself.
BETWEEN I.E. AND ETC.
12.

We can vindicate paraphrase in this manner while remaining profoundly
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puzzled about what it really is, how it really works, and what it really
accomplishes.
When first introducing Cavell’s views, I contrasted telling how to
understand a piece of language with explaining how to do so. To tell
another how to understand some words, it suffices to offer him some
exact or approximate equivalent of the words he finds unintelligible. To
explain to another how to understand some words, I need to put him in
a position to dope them out for himself by showing him how they come
to mean whatever it is they do mean. Now according to Cavell, the
meaning and content of an idiom can simply be told, but the meaning
and content of a metaphor are things that must be explained. In the
case of metaphor, he suggests, this explaining appropriately takes the
form of a paraphrase. But even if a paraphrase isn’t a surrogate, it
certainly looks like some kind of equivalent: a mere telling of what
words manage to mean, rather than an explaining of how they manage
to mean it.
We can restate the puzzle by looking at a couple of familiar Latin
abbreviations: “i.e.” (id est, that is) and “etc.” (et cetera).
The i.e. with which paraphrase so often begins suggests that what
we are offering when we offer a paraphrase is some kind of equivalent
for the language we’re explaining, even if it’s only a partial and approximate equivalent — a word or phrase or sentence with nearly enough
the same meaning and content as the word or phrase or sentence we’re
out to render more accessible. When the metaphor in question is a
declarative sentence like “Juliet is the sun,” the equivalent in question
takes the form of a (partial and approximate) restatement. When the
metaphor in question is only a part of a sentence, a single word or
phrase or clause, the equivalent in question takes the form of a (partial
and approximate) reformulation. So: i.e. suggests that understanding a
metaphor is a kind of knowledge that — a matter of knowing or seeing
that the metaphorically presented meaning and content are (more or
less) thus and such.
The etc. with which it so often closes, on the other hand, suggests
that understanding a given metaphor is a kind of knowledge how, a grasp
of a procedure, a skill or knack for letting the metaphor inspire thoughts
that will prove to be worth thinking, a skill or knack that might be
exercised in any number of different ways on any number of different
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occasions. We can attempt to display that skill or knack to one of our
teachers or convey it to one of our pupils by exemplifying its exercise in
our own conduct, much as we might attempt to display or convey the
ability to add whole numbers by doing particular sums on a blackboard.
But if we’re simply exemplifying such a skill or knack in paraphrasing a
metaphor as we do, the language we produce won’t be equivalent to the
language we’re trying to explain — any more than a particular worked
sum would be equivalent to a general formula, algorithm, or procedure
for adding whole numbers.
13.

These puzzles become deeper and more concrete when we recall the
structure of mainstream accounts of meaning in modern analytic philosophy. Such accounts are:
(a) compositional, in that they regard the meanings and contents of
complex linguistic items (sentences, clauses, phrases) as determined by the meanings and contents borne by their smallest individually significant parts — individual words — and the manner
in which these words are strung together.
(b) truth-based, in that they regard a content for an indicative sentence as given by the specification of a truth condition for that
sentence — a way for the sentence to come out true or instead,
false.
(c) communication-centered, in that they take language to be a medium
wherein we communicate our thoughts to others by enabling them
to infer the intentions with which we are speaking from the words
we utter and their arrangement.
Keeping all this in mind, what happens if we try to think of a paraphrase as an effort to capture in more nearly literal terms (or at least,
less ambitiously metaphorical terms) the meaning and content already
accruing to a metaphorical utterance?
Talk of metaphorical meaning got going in the heyday of behaviorism and logical empiricism, a philosophical moment marked by a crippling confusion of meaning and import, signification and significance,
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what language means and how language matters. The suspicion thus
arises that metaphoric meaning so-called is really a kind of import, not
a kind of meaning in the sense pertinent to semantics. The suspicion
arises that paraphrase (so-called) is really getting at why a metaphor
matters, not at what it (semantically) means.
Tolerable paraphrases of one and the same metaphor often proceed
along very different lines:
Cavell: Juliet is the warmth of [Romeo’s] world; his day begins with her; only in her nourishment can he grow, etc.
Ted Cohen: Juliet is the brightest thing [Romeo] knows, everything else is lit by her presence; [he is] inevitably drawn
to her although [he] knows this to be dangerous, etc.
Lynne Tirrell: Juliet is warm; she is bright and dazzling; she
is the center of Romeo’s world [?], etc.
Yours Truly: I understand by Romeo’s words that Juliet is
worthy to be and about to become the source of whatever
emotional comfort, whatever vitality, whatever clarity his
life will contain from here on out.. . . etc. 36
Confronted with such an embarrassment of explanatory riches, some
will be tempted to conclude that a paraphrase (so-called) of “Juliet is
the sun” consists of things that merely make for the truth of “Juliet is the
sun” taken metaphorically, not of things that are absolutely required for
it. Genuine truth conditions are not just sufficient but necessary for the
truth of the thing whose truth conditions they are. So to take this line
would be to deny that paraphrase gives metaphorical truth conditions,
hence to give up the idea that paraphrase is a mode of restatement,
approximate or otherwise.
Insist that paraphrase is open-ended and approximate restatement,
the verbal counterpart of successive rational approximations to a possibly irrational number, and you confront further problems, only one
of which is making disciplined formal sense of approximate equivalence,
approximate truth, and kindred notions in the first place:
(a) The multiplicity of acceptable nonsynonymous paraphrases of the
same metaphor suggests that if paraphrases really gave metaphorical meanings or contents, metaphors would be much more ambiguous than we ordinarily suppose them to be.
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(b) The fact that paraphrases are often stubbornly open-ended suggests that if paraphrases really gave metaphorical meanings or
contents, metaphors would seldom be more than partially and
imperfectly understood, hence much less comprehensively intelligible than we ordinarily suppose them to be.
(c) What can plausibly turn up in a paraphrase of “Juliet is the sun”
vastly outruns anything Romeo was plausibly in a position to intend by his words, hence it can vastly outrun anything Romeo’s
words as used by Romeo plausibly could have meant. The thought
that what our words mean is a matter of what we inferably intend
to accomplish by means of them seems to be under threat hereabouts. The approximate restatement view of paraphrase may
therefore seem to involve us in a rejection of Grice: a rejection of
communication-centered, inferable-intention accounts of speaker
meaning.
(d) Truth conditions owe much of their prominence in modern semantic thinking to the thought that it doesn’t take inarticulate
tact of any kind to work out the truth condition for a novel utterance; it can always be predicted from the syntax of the utterance
and meanings already permanently associated with its constituent
words and constructions. Yet it takes plenty of inarticulate tact to
accurately paraphrase a metaphor like Romeo’s. The approximate
restatement view of paraphrase may therefore seem to involve us
in a rejection of Frege, Tarski, and Carnap: a rejection of the compositionality of verbal meaning and verbal content.
14.

Here’s one additional worry; so far as I know it came into the literature
with Donald Davidson. Romeo’s words certainly haven’t ceased to mean
what they ordinarily literally mean. Someone who didn’t grasp the ordinary literal meaning of these words would thereby fail to understand
Romeo’s utterance. So if a paraphrase is to give a truth conditional content for an utterance, it must be a second such content; metaphors must
be designedly twofold in their meaning, in something of the way puns
are. Yet special cases aside, metaphors certainly don’t feel designedly
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twofold, don’t feel like puns or deliberate equivocations.37
ENEMIES OF PARAPHRASE
15.

Suppose you’re persuaded by the concise vindication of paraphrase offered by the Horse’s Mouth argument. There may still be much to learn
from hearing the enemies of paraphrase press their case. I’d like to take
up two of these enemies here.
16.

First up is Donald Davidson, pressing a worry very different from the
one I just now set aside:
When we try to say what a metaphor “means,” we soon realize there is no end to what we want to mention. If someone
draws his finger along a coastline on a map, or mentions
the beauty and deftness of a line in a Picasso etching, how
many things are drawn to your attention? You might list
a great many, but you could not finish because the idea of
finishing would have no clear application. How many facts
are conveyed by a photograph? None, an infinity, or one
great unstatable fact? Bad question. A picture is not worth
a thousand words, or any other number. Words are the
wrong currency to exchange for a picture.38
Davidson appears to be suggesting that metaphors are like pictures
in that an artifact of either kind brings to mind or commends to our
attention an endless abundance of distinct propositions about the thing
or things it takes as its subject, without thereby vouching for the truth
of any particular portion of the abundance it serves up. Such artifacts
are both richer and poorer than any literal verbal statement: richer in
suggestiveness, poorer in outright commitment. It is therefore always a
mistake to “exchange” a picture for a literal verbal statement or a literal
verbal statement for a picture, since the two sorts of representation
aren’t in the same line of representational work in the first place. We
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should never send either to do the job of the other. The same goes,
Davidson appears to think, for the relationship between a metaphor
and any of the literal discursive statements it may move us to consider
and eventually endorse.
If we had a valid objection to paraphrasis along these Davidsonian
lines, we’d have a parallel and equally valid objection to ecphrasis. Yet
the effort to put into literal words some of the most salient portions of
a picture’s pictorial content is a venerable and eminently respectable
rhetorical exercise with a perennial appeal to those who hope to use
either their eyes or their words to the fullest. There’s a varied and
extensive body of ecphrastic poetry, for instance, some of it remarkably faithful to selected aspects of the depicted content of the pictorial
works to which it speaks.39 Distinct descriptively correct ecphrases of a
single work can differ spectacularly in content, organization, and emphasis.40 And in the case of ecphrasis, the fact that the idea of finishing
lacks clear application in no way entails that the idea of starting is in
the same boat. In any case, it seems hard to deny that paintings and
photographs and metaphors can falsify their subjects, actively misrepresent them in various particular respects. This wouldn’t be possible if
they were solely in the business of offering suggestions or solely in the
business of calling things to our attention.

17.

There are deeper issues here as well, issues this compact reply to Davidson admittedly leaves untouched.
If we decide to think in terms of metaphorical truth and falsity in
the first place, it seems overwhelmingly natural to regard metaphorical
truth as something that comes in degrees and respects, with the result
that a given metaphor can be true to a certain degree and false otherwise, true up to a certain point and false thereafter, true in certain
respects but false in others. In fact, one might suspect that metaphors
always fall short of being completely true, always fall short of being true
without qualification, even at their truest. After all, it’s been plausibly
maintained that if pushed too far and relied on too blindly, even the
best metaphor eventually breaks down on us.
If we decide to think of a paraphrase as some kind of literal reVol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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statement of an original metaphorical statement, we’ll want to concede
that in most cases the restatement is only partial or approximate: the
original metaphor and any paraphrase of it we can actually offer are
at best approximately equivalent, equivalent up to a certain point and
nonequivalent thereafter. It’s often said that propositions are equivalent just in case some further proposition to the effect that they come
to the same thing is true. If that’s right, a statement to the effect that
the metaphor and its paraphrase come to the same thing would itself
be true only up to a point and false thereafter.
Yet according to the most entrenched accounts of what it is for a sentence or a belief to be true or instead, false — those built into standard
deductive logic, standard truth-conditional semantics, standard forms
of probability and decision theory — a potential truth-value bearer is
always just plain true, just plain false, or just plain devoid of truthvalue one way or the other. According to these standard theories, truth
simply isn’t a thing that comes in degrees and respects. To be sure, there
are nonstandard theories according to which truth does come in degrees
and respects, theories designed to deal with vagueness and kindred phenomena. But they are too new, too ill-understood, and too controversial
for students of metaphor to employ them with much confidence. All of
which might lead us to suspect that metaphorical truth (so-called) is a
misleadingly described worthiness to be relied upon — on all fours with
the truth of a true love, a true friend, or a true test for the presence of
some chemical substance.
Whatever else they may be in addition, the concrete truth-bearers
standard theories concern themselves with — human verbal performances (preeminently written and spoken sentence utterances) and
human mental states (preeminently beliefs) — are representations we
humans deploy in the course of our ongoing efforts to register and cope
with the complex nature of the world around us and within us. Utterances and beliefs constitute but two of many representational media we
deploy in the course of these efforts. The others include pictures, maps,
diagrams, mental images, conventional signals, and the repertoire of
naturally meaningful gestures, postures, and facial expressions that figure in face-to-face human interaction at all times and places. We may
tend to reserve the word “true” for utterances and the like on the one
hand and beliefs and the like on the other. Still, in calling an utterance
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or belief true, we ascribe to it some kind of descriptive accuracy. In
calling it false, we ascribe to it some kind of descriptive inaccuracy. And
in the various other representational media just mentioned, descriptive accuracy plainly isn’t an all-or-nothing affair, plainly does comes in
degrees and respects. Indeed, in some of these other media, notably
the medium of pictures, it is often the case that descriptive accuracy in
certain respects comes at the price of descriptive inaccuracy in certain
others.
Future theorizing about truth confronts a difficult three-way choice.
We might decide that utterances and beliefs differ from other familiar
representational media in that for them and them alone, descriptive accuracy is an all-or-nothing affair, in which case we need a non-obvious
account of why certain particular representational media — utterances
and beliefs — are special in this extremely striking respect. We might
decide that while descriptive accuracy is a matter of degrees and respects even when it comes to utterances and beliefs, truth isn’t, in which
case we need non-obvious accounts of (a) how descriptive accuracy and
truth differ from one another and (b) why they are intimately related
despite being so profoundly different. Finally, we might decide that our
entrenched theories about truth and truth-bearers in logic, semantics,
etc. need non-obvious revisions that will permit truth itself to come
in degrees and respects after all. We’ll have our work cut out for us,
whichever choice we eventually make. But for all we know so far, the
correct choice could be the last one.
18.

Next up is the American philosopher-novelist William H. Gass.
Like Davidson, Gass is eager to affirm the cognitive value and interest of metaphors, yet eager to deny that the value or interest of any
metaphor derives from the value or interest of any truth the metaphor
manages to formulate:
If metaphor is a sign of genius, as Aristotle argued, it is because, by means of metaphor, the artist is able to organize
whole areas of human thought and feeling, and to organize them concretely, giving his model the quality of sensuous display. But I do not wish to suggest, by the comVol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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parisons with science that I have made, that the value of
metaphor lies in its truth, or in its power to produce those
brilliant flashes of dogmatic light which I believe are called
“insights” among the critics who pursue literature because
they prefer philosophy but will not submit to the rigorous
discipline of systematic thought.41
According to Gass, metaphor is both “a process of inference” and
“a form of presentation or display,” whereby we are introduced to
or brought vicariously face-to-face with the metaphor’s primary subject.42 Metaphor confounds traditional distinctions between the immediate and the mediated, since it is by inferring things about the primary
subject that we are enabled and induced to come face to face with it
in our imaginations. And we infer things about the primary subject by
inferring things from . . . whatever it is the primary subject is metaphorically said to be, the secondary subject. Gass offers by way of example
this famous exchange between Hamlet and Horatio on the windy battlements, as they await the reappearance of the Ghost (I, iv, 1-2):
Hamlet: The air bites shrewdly; it is very cold.
Horatio: It is a nipping and an eager air.
He says of this likening of (cold) air to a (eager and nippy) dog that it:
has qualities both of proof and of meeting. It seems to
present us with the cold rather than name it, and it seems
to argue the cold rather than be it.43
I read this as follows. The metaphor Hamlet and Horatio jointly elaborate in this passage has the quality of a meeting, presents us with the
cold instead of naming it, in that the cold Hamlet and Horatio feel isn’t
so much named or described as conjured up in the mind of the listener. A
properly attentive audience to a properly sensitive recital of these lines
understands them by imaginatively encountering the cold of which they
speak — shivering a little, perhaps, as it does so. The metaphor argues
the cold instead of being it, in that
(a) The presence of cold in this passage isn’t due to anything cold
in or about the passage itself — there’s nothing chilly about the
passage’s diction, for instance. The presence of cold is an entirely
vicarious presence.
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(b) We listeners get from the language of the passage to this cold by
an active process of inference from things the air is explicitly said
to do (bite shrewdly) and to be (nipping, eager).
What inferences do we make? Gass offers a few possibilities:
The air bites, therefore the air is alive. The air bites
shrewdly, therefore the air is wise. It is eager, so it feels.
These deductions, upon the information that it nips, and
the immediate conclusion that it nips as dogs nip, give us
the very dog of the air itself.44
Gass holds that metaphor involves a process of inference or argument, initiated by the speaker, continued by the listener, and managed
so as to induce the listener to vicariously experience one thing (here,
a certain kind and degree of bitter and windy cold) by getting him to
infer and thereby conjure up for himself a second thing (here, a clever
nipping dog) — a process which calls on the listener to be as passively
active or actively passive as a well-behaved participant in a well-run
séance. Horatio takes the air bites shrewdly and infers from it such conclusions as that the air must be a dog, that it must be clever, excited,
eager, nippy, and underfoot (since it has just bitten Hamlet), etc. And
in inferring such a dog, Horatio conjures it up; the sonorous language
with which he announces his conclusions help to turn his ratiocinations
into conjurations. It is but a small further step from feeling the dog of
the air at his ankles to receiving an imaginary nip from this imaginary
dog. And in shuddering at this imaginary bite Horatio feels with fresh
keenness the bitter and windy cold that Hamlet and he have just now
been likening to an imaginary dog. In following Horatio’s words and
participating in his inferences and conjurations, we playgoers sitting in
warm theater seats may likewise shiver in the cold — a cold which for
us is just as imaginary as the dog of the air itself.
How does any of this bear on the possibility and propriety of paraphrase? If we regard Hamlet as having said in a spirit of metaphor,
“The air bites shrewdly,” we might be tempted to regard the subsequent
words “It is very cold” as Hamlet’s own paraphrase of Hamlet’s own
metaphor, an authorized paraphrase in my sense. We might be tempted
to regard Horatio’s “It is a nipping and an eager air” as Horatio’s attempt
to do the same thing — namely, paraphrase Hamlet’s original metaphor.
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(Cavell indulges in further metaphor when paraphrasing Romeo; why
shouldn’t Horatio do the same when paraphrasing Hamlet?) To which I
can imagine Gass responding with three objections:
(a) If he is right about what Hamlet’s language is up to — conjuring
up a dog, with an eye to eliciting a shiver or shudder — we’ll see
that stating had nothing to do with it, hence that restating is out
of the question.
(b) As for Hamlet’s “It is very cold,” it is idle, useless, an airpocket of
artlessness in the midst of high verbal art, a flaw in the passage
it purports to clarify, a momentary failure on Hamlet’s part (or
Shakespeare’s) to remember what he’s really about.
(c) As for Horatio’s “It is a nipping and an eager air,” it works all
right, it even works as art. But it functions not as an explication
of Hamlet’s metaphor but as a called-for and deliberately elicited
extension of it. Although Horatio may display his understanding
of Hamlet’s verbal gesture (and promote its intended effects on
Horatio himself) by extending it as he does, this is a matter of displaying his understanding of an invitation by accepting it, not a
matter of displaying his understanding of a statement by rewording it. More generally, one can allow that responses like Cavell’s to
the metaphors of others are often appropriate, even allow that the
ability to produce such responses is criterial for metaphorical understanding, without allowing that these responses are properly
viewed as paraphrases of the language to which they respond.
What should we make of all this?
Gass is flatly and revealingly wrong when he deems “It is very cold”
a flaw in Hamlet’s speech. In general one can and often must step outside one’s own metaphors to comment on their operation, and one can
do so without ceasing to be both useful and artful. Our own examples
of authorized paraphrase illustrate this point abundantly.
He is also wrong if he supposes that metaphor is invariably or even
characteristically engaged in the particular conjuring trick he notices
here. Even if metaphor always involves the eliciting of imaginings by
means of inferences, the imaginings in question needn’t and sometimes
can’t take the form of sensuously explicit mental images of the things
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we are supposed to imagine. Consider the traditional metaphor, popular among philosophers and theologians over many generations, that
so fascinated Borges: “The universe is a circle whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere.”45 Put that in your pipe
and visualize it.
Nevertheless, Gass effectively reminds us that metaphor is a region
of our life with language where explication and extension, expounding
and ballad-writing, bleed into each other in a manner that may leave us
uncertain which thing we’re doing at any given point, and this is something an adequate theory of metaphor should endeavor to understand.
METAPHOR AND PARAPHRASE: FOUR CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES
19.

The vindication of paraphrase doesn’t solve or even dissolve any standing philosophical problems all by itself, yet it makes the notion of paraphrase more freely available to us for the purpose of articulating our
philosophical options. In particular, it encourages us to view recent
accounts of metaphor as falling into four basic types.
(a) Comparativist Accounts (Amos Tversky, Robert Fogelin, Susan
Haack)46 maintain with Quintillian and Cicero that a metaphor is tantamount to an elliptically presented figurative comparison or simile, true
— i.e., figuratively true — just in case its primary subject resembles its
secondary subject closely enough in respects made newly salient by the
making of this very comparison, false otherwise. Paraphrase is an effort
to state more or less completely the real or supposed sources or grounds
of this real or supposed resemblance:
(i) in the case of a (figuratively) true metaphor, what it is about the
primary subject that in fact makes it resemble the secondary subject closely enough in relevant respects, given what the secondary
subject is actually like;
(ii) in the case of a (figuratively) false metaphor, what is it about the
primary subject that the speaker would have us think makes it
resemble the secondary one closely enough in relevant respects,
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given what the speaker would have us believe about the secondary subject.
(b) Semantic Twist or Black Market Accounts (I.A. Richards, Max Black,
Monroe Beardsley, Samuel Levinson, Eva Feder Kittay, Harold Skulsky,
latter day relevance theorists)47 maintain that a sentence we construe
as a metaphor has acquired a distinctively metaphorical meaning or at
least, a distinctively metaphorical truth condition or content. This new
meaning or content supplants an old one associated with contextually
salient literal construals of the sentence’s various constituent words and
phrases. It differs from the old one only in contributions associated with
constituent words or phrases that are used or best taken metaphorically, the focal expression or expressions that serve to introduce the
metaphor’s secondary subject or subjects. The contributions associated
with the other constituent words or phrases, the framing expressions
that speak only of the metaphor’s primary subject or subjects, remain
unchanged from the old (literal) meaning or truth condition to the new
(metaphorical) one.
Metaphoric reinterpretation takes place because the sentence’s old
literal meaning or truth condition would be improper or incongruous
or pointless in some sense or other, at least in the actual context of utterance. There is therefore some sort of incongruous relationship, some
sort of disharmony or clash or tension, between the unrevised meanings or contents for the focal expressions and the unrevised meanings
or contents for the framing expressions. The focal meanings or contents
undergo an adjustment that suffices to resolve or relieve this tension
in some manner. (Semantic twist theories differ in how they conceive
the mechanisms at work in this process of semantic adjustment.) Paraphrase is an effort to re-express the new metaphorically determined
sentence meaning or content in more literal or at least, less ambitiously
metaphorical terms.
(c) Pragmatic Twist Accounts (Grice, John Searle, A.P. Martinich, early
relevance theorists)48 maintain that when we indulge in metaphor, we
use words and phrases with their standard literal meanings to say (put
into words) one thing, but we are taken to mean — roughly, we are
taken as intending to communicate or acknowledge or otherwise indicate — something wholly distinct from what we have literally and
straightforwardly said. To put it another way, our sentence as used by us
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means one thing, we in using it mean or are taken to mean something
else. (Both “things” being propositional in character.) Metaphor therefore counts as a genre of deliberate overt conversational suggestion,
akin to such well-studied modes of suggestion as conversational implicature and indirect speech acts. Paraphrase is an effort to get at what
is metaphorically suggested by putting it (or some part of it, or some
approximation to it) directly into words, thereby explicitly blurting out
(more or less fully and more or less accurately) what was previously
only suggested.
(d) Brute Force Accounts (Donald Davidson, David E. Cooper, Richard
Rorty, Roger M. White, James Guetti)49 maintain that in metaphor, no
words have gone missing and neither words nor speakers have been
induced to mean anything out of the ordinary. Instead, an utterance
that would otherwise be idle or pointless produces what Richard Moran
calls a “framing effect”50 : listeners are induced to view or consider or
experience the primary subject (or subjects) in a certain fresh and special light, the light afforded by juxtaposition with the secondary subject
(or subjects). What makes a remark metaphorical is the fact that it induces the framing effect — together, perhaps, with the specific syntactic
strategy it employs for this purpose. Paraphrase (so-called) is an effort
to offer a salient and suggestive sample of the real or apparent truths
about the primary subject(s) the framing effect induces us to notice,
think about, or dwell upon.
WHY THERE IS NEED AND ROOM FOR A FIFTH APPROACH TO
METAPHOR
20.

Twist theorists are correct when they insist (in opposition to brute
forcers) that a sentence metaphor presents us with a more or less determinate thought, a more or less determinate proposition, by distinctively
metaphorical means. They are correct when they insist that we give alternative, more nearly literal expression to such a thought when we
paraphrase the metaphor that presents it. Twist theorists are also correct when they insist (in opposition to comparativists) that a metaphorically presented thought concerns itself solely with a metaphor’s primary
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subject or subjects, not with any real or putative likenesses between
primary subjects and secondary ones. Nevertheless, twist-theoretic accounts of how metaphorical presentation works are open to serious objections.
In the last of the great grand operas of the Western tradition, the one
in which nobody sings a note, Alfred Hitchcock’s Vertigo,51 a private detective named Scottie (James Stewart) falls in love with the woman he
knows as Madeleine (Kim Novak), wife to one Gavin Elster. Madeleine
appears to return Scottie’s love. She then appears to fall to her death
in an event (half accident, half suicide) for which he bitterly and all too
plausibly blames himself. Time passes, and Scottie meets a woman who
calls herself Judy, a woman to whom he feels drawn by her uncanny
resemblance to his lost love Madeleine, a woman who is prepared to
love him, a woman he promises to love in return if she lets him make
her over in Madeleine’s image. Eventually Judy allows Scottie to do this
strange and terrible thing, biting back the humiliation and disgust she
feels at each step in her prolonged transformation.
The results of the makeover are utterly stunning, and for good reason. For the Madeleine Scottie knew and loved back then and the Judy
he more or less knows and more or less loves now are in fact one and
the same woman, a woman who plotted with Elster to help him cover
up his murder of Elster’s actual wife — Elster’s Madeleine, if you will
— by means of her own staged death in the role of Scottie’s Madeleine.
So Scottie’s Madeleine, the only Madeleine Scottie ever met, never really existed yet nevertheless really did return his love and still returns
it — I really mean, I suppose, that Judy really did and still does return
Scottie’s love. It’s hard to describe a hallucination this baroque without
buying into it at least a little.
Anyway, it turns out Judy has held onto an ornate old-fashioned
necklace she had occasion to wear in her role as Madeleine. Eventually
she decides to wear it again in her new (third) identity as the madeover Judy. Scottie recognizes it. In recognizing it, he recognizes her.
And in recognizing her, he reconstructs what has actually happened to
each of them at Gavin Elster’s hands. In the climactic encounter, back
at the scene of the fake fall, he says to Judy:
Scottie: Did he give you anything?
Judy: Some money.
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Scottie: And the necklace. Carlotta’s necklace. There was
where you made your mistake, Judy. You shouldn’t keep
souvenirs of a killing. You shouldn’t have been... You
shouldn’t have been that sentimental. [Stewart’s voice
breaks in the patented Stewart manner on the word sentimental.] I loved you so, Madeleine.
On an entirely acceptable, entirely pertinent literal interpretation of
Scottie’s utterance, the souvenir Judy shouldn’t have kept is the necklace; on a more metaphorical interpretation of the same utterance, it’s
Scottie himself. I want to suggest that Scottie and Judy and those of
us who are privileged to overhear them in fact construe the utterance
both ways. It is an instance of what I like to call a twice-apt metaphor. It
presents us or confronts us with two different thoughts, embodies two
different complaints, simultaneously, in something of the way a pun
might.
Taken literally, the utterance is an explanation of how Judy was
found out and a complaint about how Judy has treated herself. It’s
reckless to keep an object that connects you so directly to a crime in
which you are implicated, and it’s unhealthy to even want to renew
one’s memories of such a crime and one’s role in it with the help of
souvenirs. This is more than enough to make Scottie’s utterance fully
and richly significant under the circumstances, and more than enough
to account for his specific choice of words.
Taken metaphorically, the utterance is an eerily appropriate complaint about how Judy has treated and is continuing to treat Scottie.
Paraphrase: You shouldn’t renew your connection to another person
(me) in a way that turns him (me) into a cooped-up, immobilized bit
of private property, simply for the sake of his capacity to help you recall
a stretch of the past that both of you would be better off trying to forget. (Of course, a parallel complaint could be lodged with even greater
justice by Judy against Scottie, and I suppose that all concerned realize
this further fact in pretty short order.)
There are four points I’d like to draw from this example.
First, twist theorists favor a satisficing picture of how interpretation
works, a picture on which we are to settle for the first interpretation
we hit on that strikes us as good enough. On such a picture, the correct
interpretation to assign a successful utterance is that offered by the simVol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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plest and most accessible interpretive hypothesis that would (if true)
adequately motivate, and hence adequately explain, the production of
these particular words under these particular circumstances. But in the
case at hand, the simpler interpretive hypothesis that takes Scottie’s
words literally and leaves it at that already adequately motivates his
utterance of these words, and such an hypothesis can hardly be less accessible than the richer one bringing in metaphor to punlike effect, since
the more complicated hypothesis is based squarely on and squarely incorporates within itself that simpler hypothesis. More generally, a satisficing picture is at odds with the fact that many ambitious metaphors
are such that we should try to make as much sense of them as we plausibly can, attribute to them as much significance as we plausibly can,
even at the risk of embroiling ourselves in fruitless searches for more
significance than an utterance’s production has given us positive reason
to expect. (Critics are speculative intelligences; they invest a great deal
of time and energy in digging what turn out to be empty holes in the
ground. That’s why they deserve the big bucks when one of their wells
comes in.)
Second, Grice taught us that language use is a matter of communication, of getting things across by manifesting our intention to get them
across, with the result that correctly interpreting a successful utterance
is a matter of working out what the speaker inferably intends his audience to make of his words. Yet the metaphoric construal Scottie’s
utterance promptly and in my opinion rightly suggests to all concerned
takes Scottie himself by surprise, with the result that the extra construal
he feels called on to assign his own words in retrospect — the extra construal Judy and the rest of us likewise feel called on to assign them —
comes as a nasty shock even to him. (That’s why he must grope for a
moment before coming up with the word “sentimental”: he needs that
moment to catch up with his own ongoing reinterpretation of his own
previous words. What other word does the word “sentimental” replace?
“Reckless”? “Selfish”?) More generally, the doctrine that the correct interpretation of a successful utterance is a matter of working out what a
speaker inferably intends to accomplish by means of his words is at odds
with the fact that we regularly resort to metaphor as a means of improvisatory experimental thinking out loud, wherein we actively hope to
be taken by surprise by how our own words are best taken.
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Third: we need to ask ourselves how Scottie and the rest of us actually hit on this supplementary metaphoric understanding of his words.
The picture I want us to try on for size runs as follows. Scottie’s utterance occurs in a specially charged atmosphere. Two people who need
each other desperately but have done each other appalling damage are
searching for some understanding of who they are and what they have
done that will offer them a way forward — or failing that, an understanding that will show them to be definitively trapped. They are ready
to think out loud, ready to brainstorm, even if they aren’t actively doing so yet. In this special atmosphere, charged with a special set of
cognitive and emotional concerns, Scottie’s utterance naturally gets reacted to as something he didn’t intend for it to be in advance, a piece
of brainstorming. And when reacted to as a bit of brainstorming, it
spontaneously cues and elicits a certain familiar kind of rule-governed
imaginative play, a pickup game of make believe, with the result, perhaps, that all concerned find themselves momentarily picturing Scottie
himself, miniaturized and immobile, tucked into a jewelry box on Judy’s
dresser.52 This fleeting bit of make believe triggers in turn a metaphoric
reconstrual of the utterance that triggered it in the first place — in a
manner we might hope to understand in more general terms.
Fourth: Make believe is a form of play, and play is something we
are used to engaging in for the fun of it, for the sake of the pleasure
or delight that engaging in it affords us or at least, promises to afford
us. Indeed, play is a form of activity that owes its momentum and coherence and public intelligibility to the way players’ actions are elicited
by and interpreted in light of their sense — up to a point, their shared
sense — of what it would be the most fun to do next and what sense it
would be the most fun to make of what they have done already. If this
is right, we’ll need to find a sense in which an audience’s sense of fun
— up to a point, its shared sense of fun — informs and regulates what
it spontaneously makes of utterances like Scottie’s. We’ll need to find a
place for pleasure on this scene of pain.53
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